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I. JUSTICIABILITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY IN VIETH
Vieth v. Jubelirerl is a significant setback to efforts to challenge
partisan gerrymandering in court. Four members of the Supreme Court
repudiated Davis v. Bandemer2 and concluded that partisan gerryman-
ders present a nonjusticiable question, while the fifth, Justice Kennedy,
determined that the Court ought to "refrain from intervention"3 at this
time, although he left open the hope that gerrymandering might become
justiciable if the right standard of proving a gerrymander is ever found.
Yet, strikingly, all nine members of the Supreme Court agreed that, justi-
ciable or not, partisan gerrymanders do raise a constitutional question
and some partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion noted that "severe partisan gerrymanders" are
incompatible with "democratic principles" and are presumptively uncon-
stitutional.4 Justice Scalia analogized "severe partisan gerrymanders" to
a decision by the Senate to "employ, in impeachment proceedings, proce-
dures that are incompatible with its obligation to 'try' impeachments."
5
Such an action would "violate the Constitution" even though it might not
t Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
1 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
2 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
3 541 U.S. at 317.
4 Id. at 292.
5 Id. (citing Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), which held nonjusticiable a
challenge to the constitutionality of a Senate rule used in trying impeachments).
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be "for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a
remedy. ' 6 Justice Kennedy apparently agreed with the unconstitutional-
ity of gerrymandering 7 as, of course, did the four dissenters. Presumably
because the plurality concluded that gerrymandering claims are nonjusti-
ciable, Justice Scalia said very little about why partisan gerrymandering
is unconstitutional. The concurring and dissenting justices also focused
on the linked questions of justiciability and standard of proof of gerry-
mandering, and said relatively little about what makes gerrymandering
unconstitutional.
Professor Daniel Lowenstein, in his article, Vieth's Gap: Has the
Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?,
differs with the plurality on the question of justiciability and with the
Court as a whole on the question of constitutionality. 8 In his view, parti-
san gerrymandering does present a justiciable question, but, on the mer-
its, he finds that gerrymandering is almost never unconstitutional. Only
when gerrymandering is aimed at a "pariah" group9 subject to the kind of
"pervasive discrimination" comparable to that inflicted on African-
Americans in the Jim Crow South10 or when it is used to "perma-
nently"'" exclude a majority group from control of a state legislature
would Professor Lowenstein find that gerrymandering violates the Con-
stitution. Professor Lowenstein rightly concludes that the likelihood of
the first type of claim arising is "small" and of the second "even
smaller."'1 2 He emphatically rejects the "excessive partisanship" theory
of the unconstitutionality of gerrymandering. He asserts as a matter of
principle-and not just out of a pragmatic concern about "manageabil-
ity"' 3-that excessive partisanship in legislative apportionment is not
only constitutional but is also consistent with both the letter and spirit of
the Constitution. The heart of his argument on the constitutionality of
gerrymandering is that "the Constitution does not try to prevent political
competition from going 'too far.' It depends on competition to preserve
the balanced structure of the government."' 4
6 Id.
7 Id. at 316.
8 Daniel Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on
Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 367 (2005) [hereinafter Lowen-
stein, Vieth's Gap].
9 Id. at 378 n.54.
10 Id. at 377-78.
11 Id. at 378.
12 Id. at 378 n.54.
13 Cf. id. at 385-86 (Professor Lowenstein contrasts his position with the plurality's ap-
proach, noting that the plurality breaks with Justice Breyer's standard for assessing the consti-
tutionality of gerrymandering because of "a denial of its practicality, not a difference in
principle.").
14 Id. at 385 (emphasis in original).
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I agree with Professor Lowenstein on two key points-that the sub-
stantive merits of the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering must
be given much greater attention than they have so far received, and that
excessive partisanship is the most important constitutional argument
against partisan gerrymandering.1 5
On the first point, it is astonishing how little attention the Supreme
Court has given, in either Bandemer or Vieth, to the question of why
partisan gerrymandering might be unconstitutional. The Justices have
bounced back and forth between the question of justiciability and the
standards of proving partisan gerrymandering without addressing, at any
length, which constitutional provision or norm gerrymandering might vi-
olate. Of course, to the extent that the gist of the justiciability debate
turns on whether there are "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards" 16 for resolving gerrymandering claims, the issue of standards is
critical, and the justiciability and standards questions are closely linked.
Yet, as Professor Lowenstein points out by paraphrasing Justice Scalia's
criticism of Justice Souter's dissent, one cannot decide on standards for
proving gerrymandering "without specifying what one would like to test
for.' 7  As Professor Lowenstein notes, a consistent theme in Justice
Scalia's critique of the gerrymandering standards put forward by the dis-
senters is their failure to link up their gerrymandering tests with a theory
of why gerrymandering is unconstitutional.18 Justice Scalia, of course, is
equally guilty of asserting that the "excessive injection of politics [into
15 Professor Lowenstein makes a number of other important points in his article-that
the congressional redistricting at issue in Vieth might be treated differently than the state legis-
lative redistricting in Bandemer, see id. at 371-73, that Justice Scalia's plurality opinion errs in
finding that the Bandemer standard is judicially unmanageable, see id. at 374-76, and that due
to the split between the plurality and Justice Kennedy, Bandemer is still good law, see id. at
388-94. On the first point, since the gravamen of the constitutional violation caused by gerry-
mandering is the excessive pursuit of legislators' personal and partisan self-interest and not, as
Professor Lowenstein indicates, the favoring of one party over another in the conversion of
votes into legislative seats, see id. at 372, then state legislative reapportionment of congres-
sional districts is just as susceptible to a gerrymandering challenge as a state legislature's
reapportionment of itself. On the third point, I agree with Professor Lowenstein that since
there was not a majority in Vieth for holding partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable,
"Bandemer v. Davis is still the law." Id. at 390. On the other hand, as I indicate below, the
substantive theory of the unconstitutionality of gerrymandering that informed the Bandemer
plurality's analysis is no longer accepted by a majority of the Court so that the Bandemer
plurality opinion's standards for proving gerrymandering are no longer determinative. On the
second point, Professor Lowenstein is devastatingly effective in arguing against Justice Scalia
that a standard that yields consistent results in every case in which it is applied is certainly
manageable. See id. at 375. My disagreement with the Bandemer standard, and, thus, with
Professor Lowenstein, concerns its substance, not its manageability.
16 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186,
217 (1962)).
17 Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 384 (discussing Vieth).
18 See id. at 371.
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districting] is unlawful" 19 without explaining which constitutional provi-
sion or rule such partisan gerrymandering violates.20
On the second point, Professor Lowenstein is also right to focus on
the claim that excessive partisanship in redistricting is a constitutional
concern. With its implicit endorsement by the plurality and somewhat
greater, albeit still limited, articulation in Justice Stevens' dissent,21 this
critique of partisan gerrymandering appears to command the support of a
majority of the Court. Moreover, as I will suggest below, none of the
other theories in judicial opinions and the academic literature is likely to
succeed in illuminating why gerrymandering is unconstitutional.
I disagree completely, however, with Professor Lowenstein's con-
tention that the extreme partisanship and excessive legislative self-inter-
est arguments are "contrary to the Constitution." 22 Quite the opposite.
Our constitutional system of republican government is based on the peo-
ple's ability to control its elected representatives. As James Madison put
it, "[t]he genius of republican liberty seems to demand ... not only that
all power should be derived from the people, but that those entrusted
with it should be kept in dependence on the people. ' 23 Legislative dis-
tricting that manipulates district boundaries for the primary purpose of
securing the election or reelection of a specific officeholder or the power
of a specific political party violates the constitutional norm of popular
sovereignty. To be sure, articulating a test for gerrymandering that dis-
tinguishes between permissible and excessive use of partisanship or other
forms of legislative self-interest is difficult; this difficulty fuels the con-
cern over whether there are judicially manageable standards for resolv-
ing such gerrymandering claims. But, as a matter of principle, an
allegation of partisan gerrymandering-defined as legislative districting
primarily, if not exclusively, intended to advance the political fortunes of
individual legislators or particular parties-should be treated as stating a
constitutional claim.
In this Comment, I review the principal arguments as to why parti-
san gerrymandering is unconstitutional. I argue that there have been four
such arguments in judicial opinions and the academic literature: vote di-
lution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; burdening the right of political association under the First
Amendment; frustrating the competitiveness necessary for democratic
elections; and excessive partisanship. However, excessive partisan-
ship-broadened and restated as excessive legislative pursuit of partisan
19 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293.
20 Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 383-84.
21 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317-18, 326. See also id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22 Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 384.
23 THE FEDERALIST No. 37 at 234 (James Madison) (Heritage Press ed., 1945).
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self-interest or individual legislator self-interest-is the argument that
best captures the constitutional values threatened by gerrymandering.
24 I
then briefly address the justiciability concern necessarily implicated by
this understanding of the constitutional problem posed by gerrymander-
ing. I suggest that although this approach to gerrymandering raises a real
judicial manageability issue, recent cases and the academic literature
suggest that assessing whether a districting plan is tainted by excessive
legislative pursuit of self-interest may not be as intractable as is generally
supposed.
1I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
Judicial opinions and academic literature indicate that there are four
constitutional arguments against partisan gerrymandering: vote dilution
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; bur-
dening political association in violation of the First Amendment; interfer-
ing with the competitive elections required for a functional democracy;
and excessive partisanship in violation of the legislature's obligation to
legislate in the public interest.
The first two arguments have the most obvious roots in the constitu-
tional text and case law. Both focus on the impact of partisan gerryman-
dering on the representational interests of the voters whose party has
been harmed by gerrymandering. Ultimately, however, neither argument
is likely to state a successful constitutional case against gerrymandering,
at least in part because both arguments are in tension with the use of
districting to elect legislators. Competitiveness is an argument that has,
thus far, only been found in the academic literature. It is a concern that
is self-consciously structural; that is, it is focused on the corrupting im-
pact of gerrymandering on the political process as a whole, rather than on
the individual rights of voters or the rights of discrete groups of voters.
It suffers from the lack of a clear constitutional basis for a concern about
electoral competition. Moreover, it is also in tension with the use of
districts to elect legislators. Excessive partisanship-or, as I will empha-
size, excessive pursuit of incumbents' partisan and individual self-inter-
est-is focused primarily on the motives of legislators. The excessive
partisanship argument also suffers from the lack of a clear basis in the
constitutional text, and raises the difficult question of distinguishing be-
24 Justice Breyer's dissent presents a fifth possible argument-the "entrenchment" of a
minority and the frustration of majority rule. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355-68. As I will suggest
below, the majority rule argument seems to be a subset of the vote dilution concern limited to
majorities, with the "entrenchment" bringing into play the bad legislative motivation which is
the gist of the excessive partnership theory. As a result, it is not really an additional constitu-
tional argument.
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tween permissible and impermissible pursuit of legislative self-interest.
However, it promotes the structural interest in democratic accountability
while resonating with the constitutional norm that legislators must act to
promote the public interest and not their own self-interest. The excessive
self-interest argument draws from each of the other theories for challeng-
ing gerrymandering, but it is alone among the constitutional arguments in
being consistent with the use of districts to elect representatives.
A. VOTE DILUTION IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
By the vote dilution argument, I mean the charge that partisan ger-
rymandering is unconstitutional because, and to the extent that, it denies
a political party the share of seats in the legislature to which it would
otherwise be entitled based on its share of votes in legislative elections.
Emerging under the rubric of the Equal Protection Clause, vote dilution
was the initial framework for the Court's approach to partisan gerryman-
dering, and it has generally shaped the Court's analysis of the constitu-
tional rules governing legislative representation. The foundational vote
dilution case is Reynolds v. Sims, 25 in which the Court first articulated
and adopted the "one person, one vote" rule as the constitutional ground
norm for legislative apportionment. Reynolds held that, due to the funda-
mental nature of the right to vote, each voter is not simply entitled to cast
a ballot, but has a constitutional right to an equally weighted, or undi-
luted, vote relative to the votes of others. Although Reynolds can be seen
as an individual voters' rights case,26 constitutional protection against
vote dilution was soon extended to racial minority groups. 27 The racial
vote dilution cases involved multi-member districts or at-large elections
in which the votes of minority voters had the same formal voting weight
as the votes of white voters, but the use of the multi-member district or
at-large structure made it harder for minority voters to elect their pre-
ferred candidates and, thus, "diluted" their votes. The Supreme Court
agreed that such racial vote dilution states a claim under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Although Professor Lowenstein contends that the racial
vote dilution cases are better seen as "suspect classifications" cases and
not "'voting rights' case[s]," 28 the Court repeatedly stressed in these
25 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
26 Professor Lowenstein takes this position. See Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8,
at 381-82.
27 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 143 (1971); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433, 439 (1965).
28 Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 377.
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cases its concern with the impact of districting on the "voting strength 29
of racial groups. Race and the burden on political rights are interlinked,
and both seem critical to the doctrine.
Davis v. Bandemer reflects the vote dilution approach to partisan
gerrymandering. The opening paragraph of Justice White's opinion re-
fers to gerrymandering as presenting an issue of "unconstitutional vote
dilution."'30 The majority's justiciability analysis begins with the one
person-one vote cases 3I before quickly linking them to the racial vote
dilution cases. 32 The plurality's ultimate rejection of the partisan gerry-
mandering claim on the merits rested on the finding that the districting
plans at issue did not unconstitutionally dilute plaintiffs' votes. 33 To be
sure, the plurality denied that the Constitution requires a straightforward
relationship between votes and seats. 34 Moreover, unlike one person-one
vote, under the Bandemer plurality's approach, constitutional partisan
vote dilution occurs only if a districting plan produces "continued frus-
tration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a
minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.
35
One of the state legislative districting plans at issue in Bandemer gave
plaintiffs their fair share of legislative seats 36 while the other produced
just a modest underrepresentation in a single election,37 and thus, could
not show "continued frustration" of the will of the voters. In effect, as
Bruce Cain has put it, Bandemer adopted a "vote dilution plus" stan-
dard. 38 Yet, it was vote dilution or the lack thereof that determined
whether the gerrymanders in question were unconstitutional.
Thus, under Bandemer, vote dilution is the type of constitutional
problem that partisan gerrymandering raises, but the dilution must be
significant and protracted in order to state a claim. In his endorsement of
29 White, 412 U.S. at 765; Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 143-44; Bums, 384 U.S. at 88; Fort-
son, 379 U.S. at 439. Indeed, in Whitcomb, Bums, and Fortson, the Court referred to the
voting strength of "racial or political elements" of the voting population, thereby further un-
dermining the argument that these are suspect classification cases rather than voting rights, or
combined voting rights and suspect classification, cases. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 143; Burns,
384 U.S. at 88; Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
30 See Davis v. Bandermer, 478 U.S. 109, 113; id. at 132 (discussing the standard of
proof "where unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of statewide political
gerrymandering").
31 Id. at 118, 121-24.
32 See id. at 119, 124-26.
33 See id. at 134-37.
34 Id. at 132.
35 Id. at 133.
36 In elections for the Indiana state senate, the plaintiff Democrats won 53.1% of the vote
and also won 13 of the 25 seats at issue. See id. at 137-38 n.16.
37 See id. at 137.
38 Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Practitioner, Theo-
rist, and Reformer, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 121 (Bernard Grofman
ed., 1990).
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Bandemer, Professor Lowenstein also implicitly adopts the vote dilution
model of gerrymandering. 39
. The vote dilution approach can be found in some of the Vieth opin-
ions. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, refers to partisan gerry-
mandering as a species of vote dilution. 40 Justice Breyer's conclusion-
that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional when used to deny a po-
litical majority a majority of seats in the legislature-also reflects the
vote dilution idea.41 However, on balance, the Vieth Court decidedly
shifted its analysis of partisan gerrymandering away from the vote dilu-
tion model embraced in Bandemer. Although Justice Souter refers to
partisan gerrymandering as vote dilution, only one of the five elements
he lays out as part of a gerrymandering plaintiffs prima facie case refers
to the burden that gerrymandering places on a political group's ability to
elect a candidate. 42 His decision to focus gerrymandering claims on indi-
vidual districts rather than on the statewide discrepancy between votes
and seats is also inconsistent with the statewide seats/votes relationship,
which, as Bandemer indicated, is central to the vote dilution approach. 43
Similarly, Justice Breyer's determination that only those gerrymanders
that give an electoral minority a majority of legislative seats raise a con-
stitutional concern-while implicitly treating as unchallengeable those
plans that would give a 51%-majority 75% of the seats (or give a 49%-
minority just 25% of seats)-also seems inconsistent with a general com-
mitment to the vote dilution or even the "vote dilution plus" theory.44
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion emphatically rejects the idea that any
political group is entitled to legislative representation in proportion to its
numbers,45 while both Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice Ste-
vens' dissent avoid reference to the vote dilution model altogether.
The vote dilution theory of the constitutional harm from gerryman-
dering has intuitive appeal. 46 An apportionment scheme that gives one
39 See also Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Pro-
tection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 89 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990)
(referring to "[g]errymandering and similar vote dilution claims brought under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause").
40 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 343, 351.
41 Id. at 360-62.
42 Justice Scalia contends that "no element" of Justice Souter's test "looks to the effect of
the gerrymander on the electoral success, the electoral opportunity, or even the political influ-
ence, of the plaintiffs group." Id. at 297. However, the fourth element of the Souter test does
address whether a gerrymander makes it more difficult for plaintiff's group to elect its pre-
ferred candidates. See id. at 349-50.
43 Id. at 347-50, 353.
44 Id. at 361.
45 Id. at 287-88.
46 See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legisla-
tive Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING IssuEs 9 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds.,
1982) (observing that parties winning seats "roughly proportional to their share of the popular
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party a greater share of legislative seats than its share of the popular vote
while giving the other party a smaller share of seats than votes sounds
like it denies the latter fair representation.47 Moreover, it grows naturally
out of the Equal Protection case law that generated the one person-one
vote and racial vote dilution doctrines. Yet, as the relative eclipse of the
vote dilution approach between Bandemer and Vieth-and even
Bandemer's earlier requirement not just of dilution but "dilution plus"-
demonstrates, the vote dilution theory of gerrymandering is ultimately
unsustainable for reasons long articulated by both judges and
commentators.
First, the vote dilution model of gerrymandering assumes that voters
fall into discrete and discernable partisan groups so that a party's share of
legislative seats can be compared with its share of the electorate. 48 But,
of course, this is often not the case. Voters can split their tickets or
change their partisan voting patterns without changing their party regis-
trations, and many voters are not registered with a party at all. Compar-
ing seats to actual votes in legislative elections is not helpful because the
actual votes in a legislative election may be an artifact of the districting
plan itself-in a one-party district, for example, members of the out-
party may not even bother to vote-or of anomalies such as an unusually
charismatic or a scandal-ridden candidate. As a result, gerrymandering
critics often prefer not to use the aggregate votes for legislative candi-
dates but rather some other measure of party strength, such as the state-
wide vote for a down-ticket state office. 49 But, of course, any such
measure of so-called baseline voting strength will be debatable. 50
Second, even if party affiliation were more firm than fluid, and
party share of the electorate could be determined, there is the theoretical
objection that the vote dilution paradigm is at bottom a theory of propor-
tional representation, and, as Justice Scalia emphatically asserted in
Vieth, "the Constitution contains no such principle" of proportional rep-
vote . . .is the very core of the term fair representation") (italics in original); Daniel H.
Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest:
Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 52 (1985) [hereinafter Lowenstein & Steinberg, The
Quest] (articulating, but critiquing, "[t]he most popular conception of how votes and seats in
legislative elections should be related is that they should be proportional").
47 Cf. Richard Niemi & Stephen G. Wright, Majority-Win Percentages: An Approach to
the Votes-Seats Relationship in Light of Davis v. Bandemer, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING
AND THE COURTS 267 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) (noting that "[tihe relationship between
votes and seats is ... of paramount importance").
48 Cf. MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? PARTISAN REPRESEN-
TATION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 5 (1st ed., 1993) (arguing that the claim of partisan gerry-
mandering "presupposes the existence of durable, identifiable groups of voters").
49 See, e.g., Charles Backstrom, et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Base-
line, in POLITIcAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 159-66 (Bernard Grofman ed. 1990).
50 See Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest, supra note 46, at 59-60.
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resentation.5 1 Even the Vieth dissenters agreed that the Constitution does
not require proportional representation.5 2 To be sure, it is possible to
promote proportional representation without requiring it, and, as
amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act demonstrates, it is possible
for Congress to pass a law discouraging state and local legislative actions
that make proportionality more difficult to accomplish while expressly
disclaiming any intent to mandate proportionality.5 3 However, to say
that the gist of the constitutional problem raised by partisan gerryman-
dering is the reduction of a party's legislative representation relative to
its share of the popular vote (however that is measured) is to implicitly
read a norm of proportional representation into the Constitution.
Third, even if a norm of proportional representation could be read
into the Constitution, the single-member district system required by law
for congressional elections and also used by virtually every state legisla-
ture makes proportionality difficult to achieve. In the extreme case, with
the two major parties evenly distributed throughout a state, if a party
were to win 51% of the vote in every district, it would win 51% of the
statewide popular vote but 100% of the statewide legislative seats. Polit-
ical scientists speak of the tendency of single-member district systems to
overrepresent majorities as the "winner's bonus; '54 other anomalies may
occur as well. District elections "are designed for purposes other than
attaining proportionality; these include encouraging consensus-based
politics and enabling the formation of a governing majority." 55 If the
Constitution requires proportionality, then the real constitutional viola-
tion is the use of single-member districting rather than party-proportional
representation. Given the longstanding and widespread use of districting
in the American political system, districting must be presumed constitu-
tional. As a result, the norm of proportionality is of uncertain constitu-
tional foundation. It cannot be that proportional representation is
constitutionally required or that a districting plan is unconstitutional sim-
ply because it fails to provide rough proportional representation. 56
51 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004).
52 See id. at 338 (opinion of Justice Stevens); id. at 352 n.7 (opinion of Justice Souter);
cf. id. at 357-58 (opinion of Justice Breyer) (noting the tension between single-member district
systems and proportional representation).
53 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(2005).
54 DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 26-39
(1967).
55 JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND: COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND RE-
DISTRICTING 61-62 (2003); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "[a] single-member-district system helps to ensure certain democratic objectives better
than many 'more representative' (i.e., proportional) electoral systems").
56 A more sophisticated version of the vote dilution argument, which acknowledges that
single-member districting systems rarely generate proportionate results and can be affected by
the winner's bonus, is the argument from "symnimetry"-that is, the argument that if one party
receives x% of legislative seats when it gets y% of the vote, then the other party should also
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Of course, the vote dilution theory has been accepted in the context
of districting schemes that tend to exclude racial minorities. However,
vote dilution with respect to racial minorities is arguably different; racial
division may be sharper and more durable than partisanship. Indeed, the
emergence of the doctrine of racially polarized voting in racial vote dilu-
tion cases makes a successful claim of racial vote dilution hinge on proof
of strong and consistent difference in white and non-white voting pat-
terns. Racial segregation in housing and settlement patterns may also
make districting a workable technique for addressing racial vote dilu-
tion-although, as the Shaw v. Reno line of cases demonstrates, racial
vote dilution and districting may conflict when larger districts and non-
compact racial groups are involved. Most racial vote dilution litigation is
based on statute, not the Constitution. Moreover, as Professor Lowen-
stein has suggested, the constitutional hostility to the proportional repre-
sentation roots of vote dilution may be overcome when dilutive measures
are aimed at "pariah" groups that have been the subject of longstanding
and pervasive mistreatment. The representational harm in these cases
comes not so much from gerrymandering alone as from the totality of
public and private actions that together exclude racial minorities from
equal access to the political process. 57 Finally, as I will suggest in my
discussion of the "excessive partisanship" model of partisan gerryman-
dering, the constitutional racial vote dilution cases are classic instances
of the improper legislative motivation at the core of that model of
gerrymandering.
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In his separate Vieth opinion, Justice Kennedy raised the idea that
the First Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause, "may be the more
relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitu-
tional partisan gerrymandering. After all, these allegations involve the
First Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because
of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their
association with a political party, or their expression of political
views." 58 Legal scholars have also suggested that the First Amend-
get x% of the seats, and not more or less, when it gets y% of the vote. See Adam B. Cox,
Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregate Districting, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. 409, 419-22 &
nn.31-36. Yet, as Professor Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg have pointed out, symmetry
analysis relies heavily on hypothetical elections and on the uniform behavior of voters across
districts. It is also ultimately inconsistent with the separate district-specific legislative elec-
tions that occur under single-member districting. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, The Quest,
supra note 46 at 55-60. Moreover, whereas seats-votes proportionality is at least inferable
from the Equal Protection norm of one person-one vote, the constitutional basis for something
as sophisticated as symmetry seems uncertain.
57 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-69 (1973).
58 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004).
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ment's protection of the rights of party members may be the basis of a
constitutional challenge to partisan gerrymandering.5 9 The First Amend-
ment argument builds on the Supreme Court's patronage cases, 60 which
deny the state the power to condition a government contract or govern-
mental hiring or promotion on partisan activity. 61 Justice Kennedy con-
tends that, like a political activity test for government benefits, partisan
gerrymandering "subjects a group of voters or their party to disfavored
treatment because of their views" 62 and, thus, violates the First
Amendment.
Like the Equal Protection argument, the First Amendment analysis
is rooted in the constitutional text and is reasonably connected to consti-
tutional doctrine, including the cases protecting the associational rights
of political parties63 and the patronage cases. The First Amendment
analysis also explains why there might be concern about districting plans
that particularly burden or penalize political parties, but not other groups
such as "farmers or urban dwellers. '64 It reminds us that, despite Profes-
sor Lowenstein's effort to sever them, when districting plans make it
harder for adherents of a political party to elect their candidates to office,
fundamental rights and suspect classifications may be linked.
Yet, ultimately, the First Amendment argument fails. According to
Justice Scalia, if the First Amendment operates with the same vigor in
the districting context as it does with respect to patronage, it "would
render unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in hiring for non-
policy-level government jobs."65 As he argues, the patronage cases re-
quire "not merely that Republicans be given a decent share of the jobs in
a Democratic administration, but that political affiliation be disre-
garded."66 Yet, even the Vieth dissenters acknowledge that some atten-
59 See, e.g. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099,
1131-39 (2005); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649,
652-53 (2002). See also Guy-Uriel Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First
Amendment, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209 (2003) (arguing that the First Amendment right of associa-
tion protects racial minorities in legislative representation).
60 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
61 See, e.g., Board of Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); O'Hare Truck
Service, Inc v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Rutan v. Republic Party of Illinois, 497
U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
62 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314.
63 See id. at 314-16 (citing California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2004);
Eu v. San Francisco Country Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)).
64 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288.
65 Id. at 294 (emphasis in original).
66 Id. (emphasis in original). Accord, Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in all the
Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELEC. L. J. 626, 635 (2004).
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tion to partisan concerns in districting is sometimes appropriate, 67 and
the Court has repeatedly upheld party-conscious districting.68 Indeed, so
long as districting is undertaken by legislatures elected on partisan lines,
legislative awareness of, and attention to, the partisan consequences of
districting seems impossible to avoid.
69
On the other hand, if the First Amendment is not an absolute prohi-
bition on attention to partisan concerns, then it is unclear what work the
First Amendment theory does. Recent cases involving state regulation of
party activity have held that the level of judicial scrutiny of a state's
action is likely to be tied to the severity of the burden that gerrymander-
ing poses on party voters' associational rights.70 Gerrymandering does
not deny any group of party voters the right to vote, the right to an
equally weighted vote, the opportunity to seek "public benefits or privi-
leges," or the freedom "to canvass the electorate, enroll or exclude poten-
tial members, nominate the candidate of its choice, and engage in ...
electoral activities. '71 Gerrymandering harms parties by making it
harder for the party group to win its "fair share" of seats. This result is
the vote dilution harm all over again, and as the vote dilution discussion
indicates, party voters do not have a constitutionally protected interest in
proportional representation.
In short, the First Amendment argument against partisan gerryman-
dering, focused as it is on the rights of party voters, fails either because it
creates a rigid and unworkable barrier to legislative attention to partisan
considerations, or because all it does is restate, without providing new or
more persuasive reasons, the claim that party voters are entitled to pro-
portional representation.
67 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 351 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
At one point Justice Stevens seems to contend that any reliance on party affiliation in district-
ing is unconstitutional. See id. at 325 ("political affiliation is not an appropriate standard for
excluding voters from a congressional district"); however, the general thrust of his opinion is
that partisan motivation is unconstitutional only when it dominates the districting process or is
the "sole and unadorned purpose" of the legislature. Id. at 326. Thus, even Justice Stevens
appears to agree that some attention to partisanship is permissible. Similarly, Justice Kennedy
finds that the First Amendment is violated only when the role of "partisan interest in the
redistricting process is excessive." Id. at 316.
68 See e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.
234 (2001).
69 Nearly a dozen states have created districting commissions to redistrict their state leg-
islatures, and another ten states have either created advisory districting commissions or pro-
vided for districting commissions to redistrict in the event that the legislature is unable to act.
See BUCHMAN, supra note 55, at 207-10. However, districting commission members are often
appointed by parties in the legislature, and commissions may be attentive to partisan concerns.
See id. at 219-20; Persily, supra note 59, at 674-77.
70 Cf. Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S.Ct. 2029, 2035 (2005).
71 Id.
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C. COMPETITIVENESS
The most important recent development in the legal academic litera-
ture is the effort by Professor Samuel Issacharoff72 and other legal schol-
ars73 to reframe the gerrymandering debate around a concern for
electoral competitiveness. 74 In their view, the gravamen of the harm
caused by districting is that by organizing voters into districts designed
to assure one party or the other victory in particular districts, gerryman-
dering eliminates electoral competitiveness, and thus undermines the
ability of the voters to use elections to ensure the responsiveness of
elected officials to the voters' interests. 75 From the perspective of com-
petitiveness, the real injury from gerrymandering is not to the rights of
the partisan groups (that win fewer seats or that are sorted into one dis-
trict or another because of their party), but to the political structure as a
whole, as a result of the reduced competitiveness of legislative elections.
From this perspective, even the voters in the majority party may lose out
if and when they are placed in districts engineered to provide the major-
ity party with a safe seat since-just like voters in the minority party-
the lack of competitiveness limits their ability to hold their representative
accountable. Whereas the vote dilution model would surely result in a
dismissal of a challenge to a so-called bipartisan gerrymander-in which
each party received "safe" seats in proportion to its overall share of the
electorate, an arrangement also surely accepted by the more moderate
version of the First Amendment theory-the competitiveness challenge
views such a "sweetheart gerrymander" 76 as just as bad as a one-party
gerrymander.
The competitiveness critique draws its strength from the perception
that the sophisticated gerrymandering of the last two decades has "dead-
ened competition" 77 by leading to a growing number of safe seats and
landslide reelections, with correspondingly fewer close races and chal-
lengers increasingly unable to oust incumbents. It resonates with the
view among many electoral scholars that the role of constitutional law in
shaping the political process should be primarily structural, aimed at en-
suring "competition and through it electoral accountability," 78 rather than
72 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv.
593 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 684 (2002).
73 See e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (2004); Samuel Is-
sacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Partisan Gerry-
mandering, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (2004).
74 Professor Lowenstein has also written more skeptically about the competitiveness con-
cem. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, The Quest, supra note 46, at 37-44.
75 See Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, supra note 72, at 612.
76 Id. at 628.
77 Ortiz, supra note 73, at 486.
78 Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 Elec.
L. J. 685, 688 (2004).
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individual rights-oriented-at least once the fundamental rights, such as
the right to vote, are secured. So far, the competitiveness theory of ger-
rymandering has been embraced only by academics, although elements
of it can be found in Justice Souter's 79 and Justice Breyer's 80 concerns
about the impact of gerrymandering on the "democratic process." How-
ever, Justice Souter's dissent expressly accepted bipartisan gerrymanders
that give the minority party proportional representation, 8' while Justice
Breyer limited his concern to gerrymanders that "entrench" a minority
into a majority of seats, implicitly accepting "safe seats" in other
settings.
Like vote dilution, the competitiveness theory has considerable intu-
itive appeal. After all, as Professor Issacharoff has emphasized, the cen-
tral purpose of elections-enabling the people to hold their
representatives accountable-is frustrated by the creation of non-compet-
itive districts. 82 The competitiveness norm shifts the analysis of partisan
gerrymandering from the rather questionable right of a group of party
voters to elect representatives in proportion to their numbers-or to be
free from districting plans that make it harder for them to do that-to the
bedrock values of popular sovereignty and electoral accountability. The
competitiveness theory also makes it possible to challenge bipartisan ger-
rymanders that create safe seats for both parties, thereby avoiding a vote
dilution challenge, while denying voters of both parties competitive
elections.
On the other hand, the competitiveness theory suffers from a num-
ber of problems. Although competitive elections promote popular control
over government, there is no specific constitutional text or doctrine pro-
moting competitiveness, 8 3 at least where the threat to competition does
not come from districting arrangements that burden the right to vote,
form a political party, campaign, or get on the ballot. The threat gerry-
mandering poses to competitiveness comes not from districting per se,
but from the interplay of gerrymandering with a host of other political
factors. The extent to which district-level competition is in decline or
that gerrymandering is responsible is debatable. 84 Indeed, the very
meaning of competitiveness is vague and uncertain. The scholars who
79 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 345-36 (2004).
80 See id. at 364.
81 See id. at 351-52 n.6.
82 See Issacharoff, Why Elections?, supra note 72, at 684.
83 But cf id. at 687-88 (dismissing the textual objection by asserting the lack of a textual
foundation for other election law doctrines).
84 See Persily, supra note 59, at 664-67. Professor Persily notes that incumbent reelec-
tion rates have also increased in statewide elections, such as races for the United States Senate,
which are unaffected by redistricting. See id. at 666. He argues that among the reasons for
reduced electoral turnover are the "rise of candidate-centered politics, the increased use of
[the] perquisites of office (such as pork-barreling, the franking privilege, credit claiming, and
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have raised the competitiveness argument have tended to emphasize the
lack of turnover and the widening margins of victories in gerrymandered
districts, but it is unclear whether competitiveness requires turnover or
even close races. In a state that is dominated by one party, elections
might be considered competitive even if the other party rarely wins, so
long as challengers are free to run for office, get on the ballot, solicit
support, and get their messages to the voters, and voters are free to vote
for them without fear of retribution. On the other hand, if consistent
majority party success is considered to violate the competitiveness norm,
it is difficult to see how that would be unconstitutional.
Moreover, like the vote dilution and First Amendment arguments,
competitiveness is in tension with districting. Even in a state that is com-
petitive statewide-in the sense that the two major parties may get rela-
tively equal shares of the votes-it is highly unlikely that each party's
strength will be evenly distributed throughout the state. Democrats, for
example, may be concentrated in the cities; Republicans in the suburbs or
in rural areas. In such a state, even a non-gerrymandered district plan
would create a large number of districts "naturally" dominated by one
party or the other. By fragmenting a state, the single-member-district
system of representation almost certainly generates a less competitive
electoral structure than statewide proportional representation. However,
returning to the point already made, single-member districting is the par-
adigmatic way in which representatives are elected. This suggests that
although competitiveness is an important value, it cannot be considered
an overarching constitutional command.
Recently, Professor Issacharoff and Professor Karlan have acknowl-
edged that competitiveness is at odds with districting, and that pushing
competitiveness may actually require gerrymandering. As they note,
"[t]here will always be Berkeley and Orange County, or their
equivalents. It would take a radical gerrymander to carve up stable and
politically homogeneous areas in order to bring them to a contested bal-
ance between the major parties. ' 85 As a result, they do not "claim that an
electoral system requires every district to be competitive. ' 86 But a con-
stitutional norm that applies only to some legislative districts and not
others is a curious norm, indeed.
With the universal applicability of competitiveness disclaimed, and
the inevitability of some constitutional noncompetitive districts accepted,
the competitiveness theory really turns into a theory of the harm to com-
casework), and rising campaign costs that inhibit effective challengers." Id. "Gerrymandering,
while still a contributing factor, is quite far down on the list." Id.
85 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 73, at 574.
86 Id. cf. Lowenstein & Steinberg, The Quest, supra note 46, at 37-44 (distinguishing
between "strong competitiveness" and "weak competitiveness" arguments and rejecting both).
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petitiveness done by "insider manipulation of the process for partisan
gain" 87 and "the insult to the competitiveness of the process resulting
from the ability of insiders to lessen competitive pressures. ' 88 In other
words, the real constitutional violation is not the lack of competitiveness
per se, but the "insult" to the process caused by "insider manipulation,"
an argument that sounds much like the excessive partisanship argument
addressed in the next section.
D. EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE PURSUITOF
SELF-INTEREST
The fourth and final theory of the constitutional violation posed by
gerrymandering, as best articulated by Justice Stevens' Vieth dissent, is
that excessive partisanship violates the legislature's constitutional duty
"to govern impartially."'89 When legislative districting decisions are
dominated or solely determined by partisanship, the legislature violates
its duty to act impartially and, indeed, acts without "rational justifica-
tion." 90 The Vieth plurality tacitly accepted this understanding of the
nature of the constitutional violation posed by gerrymandering. Citing
Justice Stevens' determination that "severe partisan gerrymanders" are
"incompatibl[e] . . . with democratic principles," Justice Scalia wrote,
"we do not disagree with that judgment" and immediately analogized it
to the unconstitutionality of the Senate's use of procedures in impeach-
ment proceedings that are "incompatible with its obligation to 'try' im-
peachments." 91 Subsequently, Justice Scalia cited Justice Stevens'
"argument that an excessive injection of politics is unlawful. So it is, and
so does our opinion assume."' 92 Justices Souter and Ginsburg, despite
their reference to the vote dilution theory, also seem to treat excessive
partisanship as the basis for invalidating a gerrymander.
93
The excessive partisanship theory of the unconstitutionality of ger-
rymandering focuses on legislative intent. Although vote dilution, bur-
dening of minority parties, or reduction of competition may result from
gerrymandering, those are political injuries, not constitutional harms.
The excessive partisanship theory might treat those factors as evidence of
a constitutional violation but not as the violation itself. The constitu-
tional harm is the legislature's violation of its obligation to act only in
the public interest. For that reason, I would broaden the notion of exces-
sive partisanship to include excessive pursuit of legislators' self-interest,
87 Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, supra note 72, at 597.
88 Id. at 600.
89 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004).
90 Id. at 318. See also id. at 326.
91 Id. at 292.
92 Id. at 293.
93 See id. at 354-55.
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which might include the creation of districts designed to ward off pri-
mary as well as general election challenges or to advance the political
fortunes of a member of a leading legislator's family. 94 Excessive parti-
sanship is merely one instance, albeit an extremely important one, of
legislative pursuit of individual or group self-interest; it does not exhaust
that category. 95
Professor Lowenstein charges that the "extreme partisanship" the-
ory-the only theory of the unconstitutionality of gerrymandering that he
actually addresses-"is not only unmoored to principles in the Equal
Protection Clause or any other constitutional provision," but actually
"runs contrary to the Constitution. ' '96 There is something to the "un-
moored" point. There is no specific text that condemns excessive legis-
lative partisanship or the pursuit of self-interest. Indeed, as already
noted, the First Amendment's approach to the protection of political
rights suggests a more all-or-nothing approach rather than one focused
on "excessive" activity. Yet, the notion that legislation, in order to be
valid, must be rationally related to the promotion of a legitimate public
purpose, is well-established. Government actions that have no public
purpose justification but aim only to advance private preferences are un-
constitutional. Professor Cass Sunstein has suggested that "the prohibi-
tion of naked preferences" can be found in six different provisions of the
Constitution,97 but the most available constitutional rubric may be the
Due Process Clause. As the Supreme Court recently observed, "a regula-
tion that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so
arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause." 9 8
Indeed, the Due Process Clause is intended to prevent "the exercise of
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate
governmental objective." 99 Districting decisions that can be explained
94 See, e.g., Larios v. Cox, 300 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (citing testimony
that the majority leader of the Georgia state senate tried to create a congressional district "that
he hoped would lead to a successful congressional campaign for his son").
95 Professor Berman reads Justice Stevens' dissent as assuming that "any pursuit of parti-
san advantage in redistricting is unconstitutional." See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerry-
mandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 811 (2005). Certainly, Justice Stevens demonstrates
considerable skepticism about partisanship as a motive for legislative action. See, e.g., Vieth,
541 U.S. at 324. But, he does not rule out all attention to partisan concerns. Rather, he finds
that unconstitutional gerrymandering occurs only when partisanship is the "sole and unadorned
purpose." Id. at 326, the "single" criterion, id., or the "sole motivation," id. at 318, for adistricting plan. Certainly, the plurality treats Justice Stevens' opinion as concerned with ex-
cessive partisanship, not partisanship per se. See id. at 293.
96 Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 384.
97 See Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1689 (1984) (citing the dormant commerce, privileges and immunities, equal protection, due
process, contracts, and eminent domain clauses).
98 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2005).
99 Id. at 2084 (citing and quoting Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
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only by pure partisanship, or pure pursuit of the self-interest of the indi-
vidual members of the legislature, fail to serve a legitimate governmental
objective and are thus arbitrary, irrational and unconstitutional. To be
sure, gerrymandering does not involve the application of state power to
individual property or liberty, so that Due Process may not literally apply
ex proprio vigore. But Due Process nicely illustrates the broader princi-
ple that government action must have a public purpose.
Of course it could be argued, as Professor Lowenstein does, that
even extreme partisan gerrymandering serves a public purpose. Citing
Madison's Federalist Number 51, Professor Lowenstein contends that the
Constitution does not "abjure self-interest on the part of elected officials.
To the contrary, it relies on self-interest-'personal motives'-to assure
that '[a]mbition [will] be made to counteract ambition.' . . . In short, the
Constitution does not try to prevent political competition from going 'too
far.' It depends on competition to preserve the balanced structure of the
government." 100
The focus of Federalist Number 51, of course, was not on the self-
interest of individual legislators, but on the protection of the "rights of
the people."' 0 1 In this number of the Federalist, Madison lays out the
theory of how intra- and inter-governmental conflict-that is, the separa-
tion of powers and federalism-provide a "double security" for the peo-
ple against tyranny.'0 2 But how would the Constitution "[maintain] in
practice the necessary partition of power among the several depart-
ments" 10 3 of the federal government and keep each of the branches "in
their proper places"?' °4 That is where "personal motives,"10 5 along with
"the necessary constitutional means," 10 6 come into play. The combina-
tion of personal interest and constitutional powers would enable the
branches of government "to resist encroachments of the others."' 0 7 The
personal interests of legislators, judges, and members of the executive
branch play a role, but only in providing them with a reason for enforc-
ing the separation of powers, and thereby protecting the liberties of the
people.
Elsewhere in the Federalist, Madison demonstrates a keen sense of
the potential threat posed by the abuse of legislative power and by the
consequent need for the people to be able to control their government
100 Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 385 (quoting James Madison, THE FEDER-
ALISTS No. 51 at 346 (Heritage Press ed., 1945)).
101 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 349 (James Madison) (Heritage Press ed., 1945).
102 Id. at 349.
t03 Id. at 346.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 347.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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through the electoral process. As he explained in Federalist Number 37,
"the genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only
that all power should be derived from the people but that those entrusted
with it should be kept in dependence on the people."' 10 8 Again, in Feder-
alist Number 51, he explains that "[a] dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on government."' 0 9 And in Federalist Num-
ber 57, he emphasizes that all other constraints on the legislature "would
be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections."' 1 0
Excessive legislative pursuit of self-interest in the districting pro-
cess subverts the popular sovereignty, which as Madison explained, is
the foundational assumption of the Constitution. When legislative self-
interest becomes the overarching factor in redistricting decisions we are
faced with the spectacle of the representatives choosing their people
rather than the people choosing their representatives. This is, of course,
very close to the argument from electoral competition previously dis-
cussed. My difference with the competitiveness argument is that the
Constitution does not require competitiveness per se-since natural
background political factors may make particular districts or states rela-
tively noncompetitive-but that the Constitution is offended when legis-
lators engage in redistricting solely to promote their personal or partisan
interests and thereby undermine the ability of the voters to assure that the
legislature is dependent on the people. This argument is also consistent
with the concern-expressed by the competitiveness scholars, as well as
by Justice Breyer-of legislative "manipulation" of district lines solely
to "entrench" incumbent individuals or parties against challenges.
The illegitimacy of excessive legislative pursuit of self-interest is
nicely illustrated by the decision of the federal district court, affirmed per
curiam by the Supreme Court after Vieth, in Larios v. Cox."' Larios
addressed redistricting plans for the upper and lower houses of the Geor-
gia state legislature. The deviations from population equality were just
under 10% for each chamber, or apparently within the deviation from
equality in state legislative plans which the Supreme Court had previ-
ously indicated was constitutional. The district court, however, found
that the deviations from equality were driven largely by the efforts of the
then-dominant Democratic party to protect Democratic incumbents, or to
promote the more idiosyncratic interests of individual members, includ-
ing the desire of one member to advance the political fortunes of his son,
and the desire of another member to create a district which would be a
108 THE FEDERALIST No. 37 at 234 (James Madison) (Heritage Press ed., 1945).
109 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 348 (James Madison) (Heritage Press ed., 1945).
110 THE FEDERALIST No. 57 at 384 (James Madison) (Heritage Press ed., 1945).
1 ' 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004), affd 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).
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springboard for a subsequent congressional campaign.' 1 2 The "selective
incumbent protection,"'1 13 "blatant[ ]"114 partisanship, domination by
"the personal interests of individual legislators,"' 15 and instances of un-
varnished "regional favoritism,"' "16 negated the state's efforts to justify
the plans' departures from population equality and rendered the plans
unconstitutional. Although, as a matter of precedent, Larios does not
mean that a partisan plan that fails to achieve population equality is nec-
essarily unconstitutional, it does suggest that extreme partisanship and
legislative pursuit of self-interest in districting is, Professor Lowenstein's
argument notwithstanding, contrary to constitutional norms.
Professor Lowenstein contends that "[a] premise underlying much
contemporary study of legislative politics is that all legislative conduct is
motivated solely by the desire for reelection,"' 1 7 although he quickly re-
treats to the less sweeping assertion that the motive for reelection is a
major influence in virtually all policymaking."' 118 Even assuming that
legislative self-interest plays a major role in legislative decision-making,
it is rare that self-interest is the exclusive factor. Most actions that would
promote a legislator's reelection do so by advancing the interests of the
legislator's constituency or of interests groups within (or outside) the
constituency. The pork-barrel legislation that Professor Lowenstein de-
nounces exemplifies the practice of promoting reelection by aiding
others. There is almost always some public interest justification for
pork-barrel legislation, even if the "public interest" is that of the constitu-
ency rather than the state or nation, and even if the public justification
cannot stand up to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Excessively partisan
or self-interested gerrymandering is different; the only things they pro-
mote are the legislator's reelection, the election of a family member, or
the legislator's party's ability to hold on to its majority and, thus, en-
hance the legislator's power. There is no public interest rationale.
Moreover, as the competitiveness critics have pointed out, exces-
sively self-interested gerrymandering can have a devastating effect on
the electoral accountability necessary to assure the legislature's "depen-
dency" on the people. As Dennis Thompson has put it, "insofar as it
involves politicians' choosing their own constituents" to protect them-
selves in office, it can "undermine popular sovereignty."
' 19 Whether ex-
112 See id. at 1335-36.
113 Id. at 1331.
' t4 Id. at 1347.
115 Id. at 1355.
116 Id. at 1342.
117 Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 387 (emphasis in original).
118 Id. at 378-88.
119 DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES 41 (2002).
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cessively self-interested districting is more or less harmful to the country
than "confiscatory taxation"120 may be debatable, but excessively self-
interested districting is more likely to lack a public justification, and cer-
tainly poses a greater government threat to the fair electoral competition
that ultimately legitimates all government action. Indeed, a central
theme of modem constitutional legal scholarship is the special legitimacy
of what John Hart Ely called representation-reinforcing review-that is,judicial intervention to "polic[e] the process of representation" and pre-
vent incumbents from blocking "the channels of political change." 12'
To be sure, it may be difficult, in practice, to determine when a
districting plan is tainted by excessive pursuit of legislative personal or
partisan self-interest, or to distinguish between excessive pursuit of parti-
san or personal goals and the permissible attention to such factors in the
context of constructing a districting plan. But, to turn Professor Lowen-
stein's point around, that is a question of practicality and, as I discuss in
the next section, of justiciability. As a question of principle, however,
there is no doubt that, as both the Vieth plurality and dissenters con-
cluded, a districting plan marked by excessive pursuit of personal or par-
tisan self-interest is unconstitutional.
III. BACK TO THE JUSTICIABILITY QUESTION
Establishing that excessive pursuit of legislative self-interest in dis-
tricting states a constitutional claim may be a mere pyrrhic victory for
gerrymandering critics if the constitutional issue as so defined creates a
nonjusticiable question. Surely, drawing a line between permissible and
excessive attention to the same factor will be tricky at best, and making
such a distinction the basis for judicial review raises the concern that it
will enable judges to vote their own political biases in gerrymandering
cases. Are there judicially manageable standards that will assure consis-
tency in the adjudication of partisan gerrymandering disputes?
The question of the specific standards for proving partisan gerry-
manderin-the question addressed in Justice Stevens' and Justice Sou-
ter's dissents as well as in Justice Scalia's corrosively skeptical plurality
opinion-is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, there is some
evidence that courts can address districting cases that require distinguish-
ing between permissible and impermissible uses of the same factor.
First, as already noted, courts have done this with respect to partisan
and personal self-interest at least once-in Larios v. Cox. 122 The district
court in that case had no difficulty finding that the plans in question were
120 See Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap, supra note 8, at 386.
121 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw 73, 105
(1980).
122 300 F. Supp. 2d. 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
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so marked by attention to partisan and self-interested concerns as to
render their departures from population equality unconstitutional, even
though the departures appeared to fall within the safe harbor for popula-
tion deviations previously approved by the Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court agreed with the district court's judgment. 123
Second, and more importantly, distinguishing between excessive
and permissible attention to a districting factor is at the heart of one of
the Court's most important recent districting doctrines-Shaw v. Reno 1
24
and its progeny. 125 Although elements of Shaw seemed to suggest that
the Court was concerned about any intentional use of race or the use of a
bizarre district shape that could only be explained by attention to race,
126
the doctrine ultimately became one of excessive attention to race, where
race is "the dominant and controlling rationale in drawing district
lines" 127 or the "predominant" factor.' 28 Some attention to race in dis-
tricting is permissible. 129 The Shaw doctrine thus provides a nice anal-
ogy and precedent for a similar distinction between excessive and
permissible uses of partisanship or self-interest.
130
Of course, some would suggest that the analogy to Shaw's notori-
ously fuzzy standard proves that a similar standard for partisan gerry-
mandering will be, by definition, unmanageable. 13 1 But, as Professor
Pildes has recently pointed out, Shaw has proven surprisingly managea-
ble: "[S]tate legislators and other actors internalized the vague legal con-
straints of Shaw in ways that generated a stable equilibrium."'
' 32
Although the Supreme Court may have failed to supply clear standards
for the application of Shaw, the political process absorbed Shaw's prohi-
bition against excessive attention to race. Despite the indeterminacy of
the Shaw doctrine, there has been relatively little Shaw litigation.
133
"The result was political accommodation and compromise that led to sta-
ble outcomes .... [V]ague law was transformed into settled practice."'
134
123 Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). See also Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Con-
stitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 77-78 (2004) ("Larios might
signal the vitality of a broader principle against state action whose sole or predominant pur-
pose is self-entrenchment of incumbents or parties .
124 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
125 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)
(plurality opinion); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541
(1999).
126 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642-49.
127 Miller, 515 U.S. at 913.
128 Vera, 517 U.S. at 959 (plurality opinion).
129 See id. at 993 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 334-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 436 (2004).
132 Pildes, supra note 123, at 68.
133 Id. at 67.
134 Id. at 68-69.
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To be sure, as Justice Scalia has suggested, the use of partisanship
in districting may be more widespread than the use of race. Bipartisan
competition is widespread, at least at the state level, whereas there are
some states with relatively little racial division, so that making partisan
gerrymandering justiciable is likely to lead to more litigation than Shaw's
rule against excessively race-conscious districting. 135 On the other hand,
Professor Pildes' evidence suggests that even in states where race is a
real factor in politics, there has been relatively little racial gerrymander-
ing once Shaw's norm was "internalized."' 136
Whether the excessive/permissible distinction will be more difficult
to draw, or cause more contention, for partisan gerrymandering than for
Shaw-type claims is both an empirical question and a hypothetical one in
the absence of a Supreme Court decision making the excessive promo-
tion of partisan or personal self-interest in districting unconstitutional.
Certainly, any standard of proving partisan gerrymandering will be more
open-ended and discretionary than the one person, one vote rule. Per-
haps, the high political stakes in partisan gerrymandering cases are a
good reason for courts to stay out. On the other hand, the high political
stakes in legislative redistricting create an incentive for legislatures to
abuse their powers as well.
Ultimately, the justiciability question is tied to the constitutional
question, or more specifically, to the seriousness of the threat to constitu-
tional values posed by partisan gerrymandering. Defining the constitu-
tional issue as the excessive pursuit of legislative self-interest or partisan
interest clarifies the constitutional values at stake, but that does not tell
us how great a threat partisan gerrymandering poses in practice. If the
threat from gerrymandering is great, then the risks of judicial interven-
tion are worth taking. If the threat is modest, then the dangers of judicial
action may be too great.
Although the Vieth plurality treated excessive partisan gerrymander-
ing as unlawful, the plurality seemed to view it as a relatively modest
problem. For Justice Scalia, the long political pedigree of partisan gerry-
mandering seemed to validate it as a practice, or at least to make it an
acceptable evil, if not a necessary one. 137 Professor Lowenstein also
135 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286. Justice Scalia appears to bolster his case that the permissi-
ble-excessive distinction will be harder to draw in the partisan than in the racial setting when
he contends that "the purpose of segregating voters by race is not a lawful one" so that race is
a "rare and constitutionally suspect motive." Id. However, the post-Shaw cases confirm that it
is excessive attention to race, rather than the use of race per se, that triggers strict judicial
scrutiny. It may be that the Court would have a different definition of what constitutes an
"excessive" attention to race compared with an "excessive" attention to party, but both racial
and partisan gerrymandering cases involve drawing a distinction between the permissible and
excessive uses of a districting factor.
136 See Pildes, supra note 123, at 67-70.
137 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274.
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finds partisan gerrymandering acceptable, and indeed well within the
range of permissible party competition. By contrast, Justice Kennedy and
the dissenters view partisan gerrymandering as far more troubling. As
long as a majority of the court believes that, then the justiciability ques-
tion will remain a live one. Vieth is surely a setback for efforts to seek
judicial review of partisan gerrymandering; however, Vieth helps clarify
the substance of the constitutional question raised by partisan gerryman-
dering, and demonstrates that for a majority of the Court partisan gerry-
mandering is a serious issue. Thus, even after Vieth, the future of
constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering remains open.'
38
138 As this article was going to press the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the
appeals in a quartet of cases challenging the mid-cycle re-redistricting of the Texas legislature.
See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); Travis County
v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); Jackson v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); GI Forum of Texas v.
Perry, 126 S.Ct. 829 (2005). These cases raise one person, one vote and Voting Rights Act
issues, but they also give the Court the opportunity to revisit the question of partisan
gerrymandering.
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